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Abstract. 
Neither traditional primary exports nor capital inflows from rich 
countries will adequately meet the foreign exchange requirements for susta-
ined industrialization in countries such as Kenya. The constraints of the 
local market, the elasticity of foreign markets, and the import requirements 
for industrial growth make the expansion of manufactured exports imperative. 
Inhibitions on this expansion are a serious aberration in industrialization 
and development policy. The consequences of export suppression are curtailed 
investment and growth, inefficient use of the country's resources, chronic 
balance of payments problemsand, eventually, an unsuccessful industrializaJ 
tion effort. 
The necessarily increasing reliance on the country's own resources 
to maintain a balance in external payments makes a serious re-examination 
of export policies and problems very timely. "Escalating" tariffs in some 
of the countries to which we might export are often a problem and should 
be the subject for intensive international negotiation. The most serious 
inhibitions on the growth of non-traditional exports, nevertheless, are 
coming not from overseas but from the exchange rate and fiscal implications 
of the country's own import substitution policies. Protectionist policies, 
whether they are motivated by balance of payments considerations or industrial 
promotion, inevitably result in the anti-protection of non-protected indust-
ries by unilaterally raising the prices, of protected imports and depressing 
the prices of all other tradeable goods. The result is the promotion and 
subsidization of industries that look exclusively to the protected local 
market, and the counter-promotion and taxation of non-protected industries 
and, particularly, exports. The effect on foreign firmsis singularly 
unfortunate; they are motivated to seek and repatriate the profits of 
import substitution (despite the frequently artificial nature of those 
profits) rather than use their international connections to expand exports* 
There is a good deal of scope for industrial harmonization and 
trade in the East African community and nearby countries but special 
arrangements between countries cannot be relied upon to sell products that 
are not competitive in terms of price and quality. 
The country does have considerable capacity to expand exports, and 
a number of industries, many of which have strong linkages into the 
agricultural sector and very attractive employment implications, would 
undoubtedly experience rapid export expansion in a non-'distorted situation. 
Nevertheless export promotion, without a thorough-going correction of the 
distortions in the price and incentive system is an exercise in futility® 
A complete review of trade, tariff and exchange rate policies is necessary 
if exports are to play their appropriate role in the growth process and 
if an outward-looking industrial sector is to develop. 
Despite (and occasionally because of ) international agreements 
designed to maintain the prices of traditional primary exports from countries 
such as Kenya,1 the chance of earning the necessary foreign exchange from 
these exports to meet the import requirements for rapid and sustained 
industrial growth can be readily discounted. A fortiori, "development 
assistance" and capital inflows from rich countries, while useful, are 
increasingly recognized as unreliable and totally inadequate to fill the 
foreign exchange gap that open£ UP if acceptable growth and investment rates 
2 
are to be maintained, An inward looking industrialization strategy, oriented 
largely toward the protected local market and away from exports will, thereforey 
rapidly run the economy into growth constraints imposed by the requirement 
that foreign payments be balanced. Inward looking industrialization is thus 
constrained, not only by the limits of the local market, but by its increasing 
reliance on the foreign exchange earning capacity of other sectors, parti-1 
cularly the traditional exports sector. This increasing dependence is ironic 
in view of the fact that stimulus for this kind of industrialization is 
often precisely to diversify the economy away from reliance on traditional 
primary exports. 
Contrary to popular myth on the subject, there is now considerable 
evidence from the 1960s that Less Developed Countries (LDCs) cannot be 
assumed to have a continuing natural comparative advantage exclusively 
3 
in primary and agricultural products, Cohen and Sisler examine the im ports 
of five industrialized areas (EEC., JAPAN, U.K., U.S., & U.S.S.R.) in the 
years 1959-60 and 1.967-68, Over this period they find that the share of 
primary and particularly agricultural imports to these countries that origin 
nate in the LDCs declined sharply, while the share of these rich countries1 
manufactured imports originating in the LDCs recorded a substantial rise„ 
1. See D»M. Etherington, "An International Tea Trade Policy 
from East Africa - An Exercise .in .Oligopolistic Reasoning"® F.R.I. Studies 
in Agriculture, Trade and Development (forthcoming) and G.D.Gwyer, 
"East African and Three International Commodity Agreements: The Lessons 
of Experience," IDS Discussion Paper No. 129, February 1972, 
2. For an earlier sounding of the alarm on this topic, see my 
Notes on the Industrial Development Aspects of the Plan" East Africa Journal 
March 1970 pp®39-450 For a recent, somewhat f&mphleteering aoproach, my 
"Toward a Protectionist Economy? Some Reaction to the Import Bens ana 
controls Recently Imposed by the Kenya Government," ICD.S. Working Paper 
No. 29, March 1972 is our of print, but a few copies are available from 
author, 
3, As Stephen Lewis has pointed out to me, historical data, when 
price distortions in the LDCs have been as they have,' are not an adequate 
basis for assessing comparative advantage. Nevertheless, while there are 
cont,s«.page 2 
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The annual percentage change in these rich countries' (individual) agricul-1 
tural imports over the period was 3,5; the annual growth of their agricultural 
imports originating in LDCs was 1<,77„, Meanwhile, for a list of six manufactured 
item categories (clothing, cotton fabrics, footwear, jute fabrics and jute, 
pearls and precious stones, and veneer), the annual percentage increase of all 
imports for the period was 12,0, while the increase in this manufacturing group 
4 
originating from LDCs was a remarkable 15% per year. Figures of this sort 
clearly suggest that labour abundant countries such as Kenya do themselves a 
considerable disservice to assume that manufacturing is not an area that offers 
much potential for export, to confine themselves to inward looking industriali-
zation, and to rely on traditional agricultural exports to earn foreign exchange. 
The fact that an overwhelming percentage of the dramatically 
increased LDC manufactured exports have come from a mere handful of LDCs 
is illuminating. These few countries, unlike the vast majority of LDCs, 
have succeeded in removing or avoiding the biases against manufactured 
exports within their own borders, and have thereby concentrated the 
benefits of the rich country markets on themselves,, The experience of 
these aggressive exporting countries suggests that policies in this area 
for any one country should not be treated as if they were policies for 
the whole less developed world taken as one country. To fantasize the 
existence of such a country is no more realistic than fantasizing the 
existence of one single, unified, industrial country, instead of the 
disparate and far flung industrial world that actually exists. Appropriate 
advice to all less developed countries simultaneously would not be very 
different, i,e„ remove biases against exports, from appropriate advice to 
any individual country (though if all countries acted on the advice 
simultaneously the results would be somewhat different, presumably resulting 
in more specialization and a more equitable distribution of the resultant 
gains). The only difference in the nature of the appropriate advice might 
be in circumstances where all LDCs were treated as one country, under these 
3 0 cont,/ a number of countries that have distorted prices against agricultural 
exports they have generally distorted their prices against manufactured exports 
to a similar degree, and when corrections are made, they generally (though 
perhaps not always) made with respect to both manufacturing and agricultur&l 
sectors. Given the fact, furthermore, that factor price distortions tend to 
particularly penalize LDC industrial sectors (i,e, wages paid in the "modern" 
industrial sector to exceed by a substantial margin agricultural sector wage), 
it may not be illicit to draw some comparative advantage inferences from what 
follows, 
4, Benjamin I, Cohen and Daniel G, Sisler, "Exports of the Developing 
Countries in the 1960's "Review of Economics and Statistics, vol LIII 
No,4,Nov. 1971, 
circumstances "optimal tariff" arguments and policies designed to exploit 
a monopoly position become relevant,, (The basic difference is, of course 
in the shape of the demand curve facing any individual country on the one 
hand, and all countries on the other. By analogy with micro theory, however, 
one does not advise a firm in an atomistic market structure to behave like a 
monopolist merely because of the inelasticity of the demand curve facing the 
entire industry,) 
In the context of an increasing reliance of countries such as Kenya 
on export markets, international trade liberalization efforts assume particular 
importance. Escalating tariffs by stage of processing and the prospects of 
"backlash" protectionism in the industrialized countries if LDC exports expand, 
clearly deserves attention. 
It is often precisely those industries in which comparative advantage 
is shifting to the LDCs that are experiencing the worst adjustment problems 
in the rich countries. The consequent pressure in those countries for 
protection against imports from LDCs is hard to resist, despite the fact 
that everyone, including the protecting country is made worse off. These 
issues should be the subject of vigourous negotiating efforts at multilateral. 
5 and bilateral forms. 
While some rich countries will undoubtedly continue to use import 
restrictions to stave off adjustments that"should be made and to protect 
inefficient employment at home, there will be some limit to the price they 
are prepared to pay in this regard, Gunnar Floystad calculates that with 
manufactured LDC exports representing only about 0,2% of the total volume 
of manufactured goods produced in the industrialized countries, and with 
an annual growth rate of 4,2% in these rich countries, imported manufactures 
from LDCs to rich country markets would not have to increase to more than 
about 1% over the next 2 0 years even if LDC manufactured exports increased 
cumulatively by as much as 20% per annum,^ 
For each individual commodity or project that looks at the export 
market, existing or potential trade and commercial policies of consuming 
5» For a discussion of the issues and some of the recent historical 
experience with the negotiations on these issues, see H,G0 Johnson (editor), 
Trade Strategy for Rich and Poor Countries George Allen and Unwin (1971), 
especially parts I & II, 
6, Flo'y stad, Gunnar^ Foreign Trade, Aid and Economic Growth, 
Universitersforlaget, 1968, 
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country governments must obviously form a part of any market analysis,, 
Nevertheless, it would be a very serious mistake to think that the discrimi-
nation of certain other countries against some of Kenya's existing or 
potential exports justifies compounding the problem by local policies that 
discriminate even further against our own exports. Undue export pessimism has a 
habit of resulting in a number of import substitution policies whose anti-
export biases make the initial pessimism self-fulfilling. Export markets, 
especially for manufactured and semi-manufactured commodities, are often 
fairly concentrated and highly competitive. Doubts about wether Kenya 
should be exporting, inefficiency, excessive red tape and delay in getting a 
particular project off the ground, or any one of a number of price discrimi-
nations that reduce the competitiveness of the export, simply mean that the 
market is supplied by someone else. 
The cases of two excellent export lines that were forgone recently 
might be illustrative. One was a large contract that was terminated for 
price reasons. The exporter in this case was unable to get the export rebate 
to which he was entitled on a reliable enough basis to incorporate it into 
his price quotation. Furthermore the monopoly.creating transport licencing 
system resulted in transport costs that were far in the excess of those that 
would have been incurred if competitive transporters had been permitted. 
In this case the market was lost to a New Zealand supplier. 
The second case involved an agricultural production and processing 
project designed to supply a large food processor in Europe, The capital, 
know-how, etc, for the project was all there, and it offered good returns 
all the way down the line. After more than a year of negotiating and efforts, 
the agricultural part of project still could not be finalized, so the same 
company moved to Greece, The production, processing and export is now 
being done from there, and a major marketing outlet is now closed. 
At the more aggregative level, the statistical association 
( i 
between export growth and the growth of investment is now familiar, 
Fanny Ginor, for example, in a study of 55 countries over 18 years finds 
the corelation coefficient between the two to be 0,636 and that the 
growth rate of exports "explains" 40 percent of the growth rate of investment^ 
7, Her regression equation is the following: GI = 0o504GX x 3,122 
where GI and GX are the average annual growth rates of investment and 
exports respectively, 0,404, F. Ginor, "Exports knd Economic Growth" 
Israel Quarterly of Economics vol.1 no.l Winter 1971/72 pp»50-65 
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She attributes the contribution of export growth to investment firstly 
to the increased capacity to import investment goods with the export 
earnings, secondly to the increased demand for investment when the market 
is not limited to within the national borders, and third to the increased 
local savings that are generated by export industries. 
Kenya is currently plagu ad by what growth theorise must regard as a 
series of paradoxes in the area of investment and capital use. Each of the 
paradoxes I shall briefly refer to can be seen, at least in part,as a direct 
consequence of a market limitation which, in turn,is the consequence of the 
overwhelmingly domestic orientation of the industrial sector. 
First of all industrial capital utilization in Kenya is low and 
most industries run with considerable excess capacity; hardly an appropriate 
situation in a capital scarce country,, There is little doubt that the 
protectionist syndrome of the proliferation of lines of production, all 
geared toward the local market which is simply not large enough to keep the 
necessary indivisible capital equipment fully occupied, is among the prime 
explanations for this paradox, 
A second paradox is the low interest rate for industrial lending 
that prevails in Kenya, paradoxical again because it could be regarded as 
the prime signal of capital abundance. The resultant pressure from foreign 
firms to borrow locally rather than being in foreign capital has been met 
9 
with regulations to put a ceiling on such borrowing In part this interest 
rate phenomenon can be simply attributed to inadequately functioning capital 
markets. In general Kenya, in common with a number of similar countries, 
is characterized by a highly compartmentalized capital market with little 
intermediation between compartments. The result is a low industrial lending 
interest rate in the presence of what amounts to chronic capital scarcity 
in other sectors. 
Nevertheless the low industrial lending interest rate still 
calls for an explanation. High profits and rates of financial return are 
commonplace in Kenya industry, but a low interest rate in theory suggests 
8 0 For a detailed study of capacity utilization in Kenya's 
industrial sector, see the forthcoming work of Mary Anne Bailey, 
a research associate of this Institute. 
9, Risk aversion and the fear of expropriation could provide 
an additional incentive for borrowing locally but that would explain a 
higher than expected local interest rate, not the opposite. 
that at the margin, rates of return are low (otherwise why would entrepreneurs 
not step in and take up the slack until rates of return and borrowing rates 
were more nearly equated)®1^ The "absence of entrepreneurs" argument lends 
i i i 
some explanation, but there does not seem to be any shortage of entrepreneurs I A 
to step into the easy profits of import substitution, and entrepreneurs, like 
other skilled categories of manpower can always be imported. 
At least part of the explanation for the interest rate paradox would 
seem to be a shortage of good industrial investment opportmities, again, 
as a direct consequence of the limitations of the local market and the 
artificial unattractiveness of exports. High profits are being made in import, 
substitution but with a readily satiable market and existing overcapacity 
the incentive for reinvestment is simply not there. Various government subsidies 
and inducements to investers in these circumstances don't get to the root 
of the problem; insofar as they are successful, in. fact, they tend to result 
i i1 
in a wastage of capital, i.e. investment where the real economic payoff is lowe 
The result of the system is the final paradox (again, not uncommon 
in less developed countries where the policies under attack in this paper 
prevail) of capital export. As we shall discuss, the ultimate source of 
the artificial profits made available by protection is those sectors of the 1 11 
economy ;hat are not protected (are anti-protected). i The protectionist 
syndrome therefore becomes a means whereby industrial entrepreneurs (if they 
are also successful bureaucratic entrepreneurs) extract capital from the 
most capital starved and discriminated against sectors and, for lack of 
industrial investment opportunities, export it. 
The response of exchange controls under these circumstances is a 
» . • 
common one, but a poor one indeed. Again, it is not dealing with the 
i 
cause of the problem. It is an effort, in the social interest, to prevent 
people from doing what the system motivates them to do, rather than an 
i 
effort to motivate them to do what is in the social interest, the latter 
10. Capital market imperfections, which result in investments with high 
rates of return being ignored if they do not occur among those customers with 
which the financial institutions choose to deal, would imply that marginal 
rates of return are low among the favoured customers but would say nothing 
about the rest. I am grateful to K. Burke Dillon, a research associate 
of this institute who is currently completing a study of capital markets in 
Kenya for a useful discussioh on this topic. 
11. For a full discussion of witting and unwitting inter sectoral resource, 
flows, see: S.R. Lewis, Jr. "Agricultural Taxation and Intersectoral Resource 
Transfers," I.D.S. Discussion Paper No® 134. 
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being the essence of good economic policy-making. If the various other 
trade, protection and currency overluation policies are maintained intact, 
it is virtually certain that exchange control with its inevitable attendant, 
the currency black-market, will have to be part of the package. Nevertheless, 
it must be recognized that it is virtually impossible for exchange control to 
plug the leaks successfully. Furthermore, it introduces extreme arbitrariness 
and rigidity, and therefore inefficiency, into the allocation and use of 
foreign exchange. Finally, the prospect of exchange control is hardly 
conducive to investment and the inflow of foreign funds. On a net basis, 
it is perfectly possible for exchange controls to worsen the foreign holdings 
of a country. 
The purpose of this first section of this paper has been to argue 
that Kenya must think in terms of exports, and that these must include manufa-
ctured exports. Inhibitions on the exporting ability of the country should 
be seen as serious aberrations in development and industrialization policy. 
The result of these aberrations is a series of unfortunate and paradoxical 
economic ailments that are not amenable to the curative policies they frequetly 
engender. Chronic foreign exchange difficulties and an unsuccessful industria-
lization effort are the sure consequences of the protectionist, inward-looking 
option in industrialization and trade policy. It has also been inferred, and 
will now be argued, that while Kenya should do everything possible to reduce 
the discrimination of other countries against Kenya exports, the most serious 
anti-'export discrimination might well be coming, unwittingly, from within. 
Kenya's own trade and commercial policies, often designed,ironically to promote 
industrialization, are increasingly imposing the major barriers to the develop-
ment of exports, particularly in the non-traditional and manufacturing category. 
In view of the fact that Kenya's policies are more amenable to decision-imaking 
within Kenya than the policies of the countries to which we hope to export, the 
tenor of this paper is one of optimism. 
Before going into specific policies and prospects for Kenya's 
manufactures exports, let us briefly review the export consequences of the 
protectionist policies that have come to be regarded as normal in countries 
such as Kenya, I shall not attempt to cover the ground that has been so 
fully covered in the IDS series of papers on Trade, Protection and Indust-
rialization; nevertheless, export promotion must be seen in the context of 
the complete package of the trade and commercial policies that exist. 
The reason is simply that the notion that some industries can be protected 
without other industries being antiprotected and discriminated against is 
what McKinnon and Shaw call "the fundamental policy illusion". 12 
12, R.I, McKinnon and E.S. Shaw, "Policies in Restraint of Development," 
mimeo, Stanford University, 
(I use the word "anti-protected," since "unprotected" fails to convey the idea 
that, in the presence of protected industries, unprotected industries are 
made less able to compete than they would be in a free trade situation)® 
The arguments for the promotion of industrialization in countries 
such as Kenya are examined in detail in the papers of John Power and 
13 
Stephen Lewis in the IDS series mentioned* In essence, the problem is that 
the promotional tools chosen, by which the rest of the economy could sub-
sidize the industrial sector, viz. tariffs and import restrictions, have 
the effect of promoting and subsidizingg only those industries that cater 
to the local market where protection is applied. The unwitting effect of 
these policies is the anti-protection of those industries, be they exporting 
or import substituting, that are not operating behind protective barriers. 
The result is, as reference to the Phelps - Wasow data on effective protecJ 14 
tion and international viability will, show, enormous differences in real 
efficiency are tolerated and encouraged in Kenya's industrial sector. In 
some industrial categories, only the most super-efficient subset of lines 
can survive; in other categories, highly inefficient industries and lines 
are made to appear profitable, and are therefore stimulated into production. 
The picture that emerges is an incredible hodge-podge that no planner in his 
right mind could possibly have intended. In general, in fact, it is those 
industries in which Kenya probably has the greatest comparative advantage, 
those in which Kenya can compete successfully with the rest of the wcr\d and 
should therefore be encouraged, that end up being the most anti-protected and, 
therefore, discouraged. 
The ways in which protectionist policies do, in fact, discriminate 
against exports and non-protected import substitutes are now familiar. 
First of all, import restrictions put up the scarcity price^of the products 
16 protected and (depending on the supply elasticities) the resources and 
13. John H, Power "The Role of Protection in Industrialization 
Policy" IDS Discussion Paper No. 136 April 1972 
Stephen R. Lewis "The Effects of Protection on the Growth Rate of the 
Economy and the Need for External Assistance" IDS Discussion Paper No. 140. 
14. M.G. Phelps and B e Wasow,"Measuring Protection and its Effects 
in Kenya, "IDS Discussion Paper No. 147 April 1972. 
15. I use the words "scarcity price" since it is tmaffected by price control® 
Price controls do not alter the price at which an item can be sold they 
merely alter the price at which legal transactions take place with the 
effect that the gains of a .price increase are diverted into "informal" channel 
16. Even in the large and competitive U.S. market, Louis and Frances 
Esposito find that "less restrictive trade policies encourage more 
cont...pg.9 
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inputs that they use. In effect one has a kind of a partial inflation, 
with the export parity price being the only one that does not rise, 
(General deflationary measures are obviously no solution to this problem 
as they apply across the board, and the anti-export bias remains). 
Duty rebates for the imported components of exported commodities can go a 
certain distance in redressing the anti-export bias involved here, but short 
of an extremely detailed input-output table, complete with all the elasticity 
coefficients, it is simply not possible to estimate the duty rebate necessary 
to remove the price disadvantage on any particular item,^(Given a uniform 
tariff on all imports, of course, the appropriate "duty rebate" for exports 
would be a subsidy equivalent to the tariff). Suffice it to say that it is 
not merely the dutiable or banned imports that go up in price or down in 
quality, or both, relative to external goods; the price effects pervade a 
large section of the economy, eventually putting up the costs, and under-
mining the competitiveness of the range of non-protected tradeable goods 
industries. 
The resource allocation consequences of these price distortions 
are obvious. Resources are drawn into protected industries and, since we 
are not in the happy world where all resources are abundant, they are drawn 
out of the industries that are not protected. The discrimination, therefore 
is once again against non-protected industries and, as long as we are not 
16, cont,/ competitive pricing behaviour in domestic industries," Review 
of Economics and Statistics vol LIII, No,4, November 1971), There can be 
little doubt that the operative price ceiling for most of Kenya's tradeable 
products is set by the external price, and, in the case of import substitutes, 
by the c,i,f, price plus tariff where a tariff is operative. Where quantita-
tive controls or import bans are operative, of course, no such price 
ceiling exists, the result being more unmitigated monopoly, 
17, The duty rebate system in Kenya must be regarded as virtually 
non-functional except for a few influential firms0 In the case where 
the exporter is also the importer he may apply, through an incredibly 
long drawn out and complicated procedure, to become gazetted as a "conce-
ssionaire", Long and hard bargaining ensues with East African Community 
customs officials as to exactly the percentage of dutiable material 
incorporated in the export and even then it appears to be a matter of luck 
whether or not the duty is refunded. If the importer of the material is 
not the same firm as the processor and exporter, let alone more involved 
linkages, there is no mechanism whatever to so much as claim a duty rebate. 
The Kenya Export Promotion Council recently completed a survey of 
Kenya exporters; their final question was: "Have you any comments regarding 
your exporting position and why you feel it is being limited?*' The 
following sections of two of the replies represent the recurring theme 
that inflated costs for inputs and packaging materials are undermining the 
ability to compete; 
cont..,,pg. 10 
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(shillings earned per dollar's worth of exports are less than they would be), 
and the importation of non-tarriffed goods are being subsidized (fewer shillings 
are paid per dollar's worth of imports than would otherwise have to be paid). 
Since the non-tariffed imports are generally capital goods, intermediate 
goods and other "essential items", their subsidy will tend to make them 
a) overused, and b) underproduced locally. The result is,of course, discrimi-
nation against the production and use of local intermediate and capital goods. 
In the case of the overuse of foreign capital goods, there are obvious impli-
cations for both capital intensity and appropriate technology; highly profi-
table small domestic shops producing producer goods and components are made 
to appear uncompetitive at the exchange rate affecting them, and so are 
commercially unprofitable and many never get started. The favouring of 
foreign over local intermediate goods has implications for the backward 
linkages from industry into other domestic sectors. Some of the most 
predictable exports for Kenya would be in the agricultural and forestry 
product processing categories. The employment implications for these 
kinds of industries are appealing. The protected currency overvaluation, 
however, makes linkages to overseas suppliers, whose materials appear cheap, 
seem more profitable than linkages to domestic suppliers, whose goods 
appear more expensive at the official exchange rate. 
A way of estimating the extent of the local currency overvaluation 
engendered by protection (and thus the extent of the non-tariffed import 
subsidy and export tax) is to consider the complete removal of all import 
controls and tariffs. Imports would undoubtedly increase and the ensuing 
balance of payments problems would require a substantial devaluation. The 
extent of the devaluation that would be required to preserve balance of 
payments equilibrium in a totally free trade situation is the extent of 
the overvaluation that existing commercial policies are protecting. It 
would seem unlikely that the extent of the overvaluation currently being 
l 
protected in Kenya is less than about 2CP/c0 The implications are, of course, 
that in the absence of trade and exchange rate liberalization an export 
subsidy of that order should be given merely to remove the anti-export bias 
19 that exists. 
19, It is important to see that a protective tariff on import control 
is a subsidy from the rest of the economy to the producer of the protected 
item who is, hopefully, saving foreign exchange. That subsidy is only 
available, however, when the producer sells in the local market. (I say 
the subsidy is from the rest of the economy rather than specifying the 
consumers of the protected item because the revenue resulting from a price 
increase could equally be taxed into general coffers). An export subsidy 
is thus a complete equivalent to an import tariff or control except that the 
cont.....pg» 12 
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It should be noted, incidentally, that while external aid and 
credits may usefully augment local capital and lead to higher rates of 
GNP growth and exports, and inflow on the capital account may also have 
the effect of shoiing up an inappropriate exchange rate in exactly the 
same way as import controls, and with identical anti-export effects, 
Benjamin Cohen finds a negative correlation between net capital, inflows 
41 
and export expansion for a cross section of LDCs. In a statistical analysis 
of two separate periods, he finds, furthermore, that an extra dollar of 
exports contributed substantially more than an extra dollar of foreign 20 
investment to the growth of GNP» This finding runs counter to the previously 
held notion that a dollar"s worth of aid made a greater net contribution to 
development than the equivalent amount of export earning. (in part the 
former notion was based on the rather patronizing assumption that foreign 
aid permitted string-pulling that could be used to improve the development 
policies of the recipient country)o The finding suggest that while 
massive aid inflows may well be helpful, they do permit economic policies that 
can make the recepients worse off than/might have been if they had rejected 
• 21 the -aid and expanded exports. 
19. cont0/ firm's reward is for exporting and foreign exchange earning, as 
opposed to import substituting and foreign exchange saving. Both an export 
subsidy and an import tariff or control are implicit admissions that the 
local currency is overvalued and can be thought of as exchange rate 
correction mechanisms for particular industries, with the former applying 
to the overseas market and the latter applying to the domestic market. 
The dangers of irrational non-uniformity of these corrections between 
industries persist, but an export subsidy equivalent to the tariff (or 
implicit tariff) at least equates .the incentive to the firm between 
exporting and import substituting, and equates the premium that the 
economy is seen to place on foreign exchange earning and foreign exchange 
saving, with the result that the domestic cost of balancing foreign 
payments is likely to be reduced. 
20o The regression equations for the two periods were in the 
following form (T-ratios in parentheses); 
1955-60 /\.GNP = o!94 + ,621 />E + .130 R 2 = , 627 
GNP ( 9,27) (4,69)GNP (5„37)GNP F( 2,24) = 22.806 
•• 2 1960J65 /-'.GNP = ,243 + ,215 U E + „101 _F_ -g- __ 2 5 Q 
GNP ( 8,77) (2.15)GNP (3.47)GNP F(*2,38)= 7.681 
Where F and$E are net foreign investment and the increase in export, 
earnings respectively over the six year periods specified. See 
Benjamin I Cohen, " Relative Effects' of Foreign Capital and Larger-
Exports on Economic Dev elopment" Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol L. No. 2, May 1968. (p.281) 
21, See Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed 
Countries George Allen and Unwin, 1.967 (Chap.2) 
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This may be an appropriate point for a brief comment on private 
capital inflows into Kenya, In view of the artificial nature of the 
profits that are made available by unilateral import restrictions 
(i,e, value added at domestic prices considerably overstates value added 
at world prices, the firm is therefore granted financial profits which may 
be partly, or even totally, washed out in an economic analysis), foreign 
firms that produce for the protected domestic market and then repatriate 
(as they presumably must) foreign factor payments and profits, are likely 
22 
to be particularly disastrous in terms of foreign exchange efficiency. 
When imported factor payments, imported intermediate good payments, and 
profit remittances are all subtracted from the c.»i0fo value of the 
imports substituted, the net saving of foreign exchange may be negligible, 23 and in some Kenyacases it is negative. The local resource cost, in the 
meantime, may be substantial. The result is clearly exploitation in the 
i 
least favourable of its definitions. The firm is exploiting the foolish®1 
ness of policy makers, and making its profits in the absence of any profit 
to society. This possibility suggests that foreign private projects that 
plan to look exclusively toward the local market should be examined with 
some care, particularly in the area of requests for protection from their 
foreign competitors. One of the main advantages of foreign firms is 
their knowledge of foreign markets. This is knowledge that, should clearly 
be exploited by Kenya in the efficient use of its resources in earning 
foreign exchange; foreign firms should therefore be encouraged into 
24 export production and out of protected import substitution. 
22, "Foreign exchange efficiency" refers to the local cost of the 
resources used in the net saving or net earning of one unit of foreign 
exchange. If this local cost is greater than the exchange rate, the 
activity is inefficient, if it is less than the exchange rate(K.Shs/£), 
it is efficient by this definition, 
23, See Phelps Wasow, op„cit, 
24, If purely negative means are used to divert foreign investiment from 
import substituting to exporting industries, e,g, introducing economic 
cariteria into the project seletion mechanism and simply not permitting 
foreing investment into industries that rely for their profitability on 
the distort"ed prices of a protected local market, the volume of foreign 
investment would undoubtedly go down. If, however export industries were 
made more attractive by the removal of the commercial policy and exchange 
rate biases against them, there is no reason why the aggregate inflow of 
foreign investment should not be at leat as high, and probably higher 
than it would otherwise have been. The real payoff to the local economy 
of that investment, furthermore, would be very much higher. 
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The first part of this paper discussed the necessity of considering 
manufactured exports as part of a rational industrialization strategy, and 
the hazards involved of biasing Kenya's industrialization and development 
strategy away from exports, The second section has looked at some of the 
biases and discriminations against exports that have unintentionally been 
incorporated intc the price system either in the interests of balance of 
payments equilibrium or in an attempt to promote "industrialization,," The 
problem has been that import curtailment promotes only import substitution, 
it counter-promotes exports. In the longer run, export suppression has been 
the invetibale, though unintended, corollary of import suppression. 
Economists are generally loathe to make blanket policy recommendations 
of too specific a nature, lest they be generalized to situations where they 
do not apply, and this writer is no exception. In such areas as the choice of 
labour intensive products, the choice of "appropriate" technology (again 
generally referring to factor intensity), the encouragement of industries 
i 
with backward linkages, preferably into agriculture, the subsidization of 
exports, and the encouragement or discouragement of foreign capital, 
horrendous mistakes have often been made by the application of a policy 
prescription that was just right for some situation other than the one 
where it is religiously applied0 
The danger on the other side is that if appropriate blanket reco-
mmendations are made? remove factor and product price distrotions, correct 
for any divergences between social and private profitability, get on with 
social and promotional infrastructure and let profit-maximizing enterprises, 
be they government or private, figure out rational product choices, factor 
intensities, linkages, imports and exports, etc,, one is accused of impracti-
cality and retreating into bland theorizing. 
Now we have mapped, in self-defence, some of the hazards of the 
task, let us proceed to the final section of this paper. In view of John 
Power's clearly written and well-reasoned paper proposing a simple, feasible 
25 
policy package to promote an unbiased, dynamic,exporting economy, I shall 
not attempt to outline any comprehensive scheme to remove the anti-export 
and other biases from the incentive system. Nevertheless, it is worth 
recognizing that attempts at export promotion that do not correct for these 
25, John H, Power, The. Role of Protection in Industrialization 
Policy, IDS Discussion Paper No, 136, April, 1972, 
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biases are not going to scratch the surface of the problem, If the current 
trend toward protectionism not reversed, there can be little doubt that 
Kenya will increasingly get into a situation of export lethargy, chronic 
balance of payments disequilibrium and eventually, declining industrializa-
tion and growth. Exhortations to local manufacturers, President's prizes 
to exporters, attractive industrial stands at trade fairs all over the 
world, and vigourous speeches about preferential trade in the various 
forums where such speeches should be made notwithstanding, if the anti-
export price distrotions, some of which are mentioned in this paper, are 
not corrected, manufactured and non-traditional exports from Kenya will get 
nowhere. And policy-makers will have no-one to blame but themselves 
and those who misadvised them. 
The employment implications of these export lines must be regarded 26 
as very considerable, I have discussed elsewhere why the labour-intensity 
of Kenya's exports might be expected to be greater than the labour intensity 
of imports and the sorts of import substitutes that would require protection. 
Other factor intensity questions have already been raised in this paper, 
and while the magnitude is unknown, the direction of the bias introduced 
by protectionist policies is clearly away from labour intensity. One might 
even go further and suggest that the disequilibrium labour price that is 
increasingly a feature of Kenya's industrial sector is a creature at the 
28 
artificially high profits made possible by protection. Even if the factor-
intensity effect was negligible, however, more liberal policies tend to 
encourage the local production of commodities which, because they are exported 
have far better prospects for expansion than commodities that are restricted 
to the domestic market. 
26, Peter N, Hopcraft, op, cit, 
27, Bernard Wasow has correctly pointed out to me that predictions 
based on a conventionally over-simplified two factor world are likely to be 
misleading. The introduction of differences in relative natural resource 
abundance can,for instance, lead to insuperable difficulties in predicting 
appropriate capital-labour ratios, even if human capital is included in the 
capital definition, A number of highly efficient "natural resource in-
tensive" industries in Kenya which may perforce be capital intensive, may 
explain the lack of any significant relationship between, capital labour 
ratios and his measures of protection and viability(op,cit), There is 
also the possibility that some of Kenya's LDC trading partners may be 
relatively more capital scarce than we, which would, of course, lead to 
the prediction that our imports from them would be more labour intensive 
than our exports to them 
28, This high wage, in turn, means that in the kinds of labour 
cont,,,,pg,16 
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In short, what is offered by an outward orientation is the rapid 
expansion of efficient labour intensive lines of production. No rational 
strategy for employment can afford to ignore such a possibility. In 
discussing the industrial policies of two of the countries that have chosen 
2 9 outward looking development strategies, Bela Balassa writes: 
Exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods have contributed 
to the growth of the national economies of Taiwan and Korea by 
utilizing the two countries' abundant resource, labour, and economizing 
on its capital; by permitting the use of large-scale export industries; 
as well as by creating demand for domestic materials, raising incomes, 
and augmenting the availability of imports. The contrast with other 
developing countries is evident: during the sixties, per capital incomes 
rose at an annual rate of 6,5 percent in Taiwan and Korea, compared to ^q 
slightly over 2 percent a year in the non-oil-producing developing countries. 
Some further comments and observation on policies and prospects 
for Kenya's manufactured exports are perhaps in order. It must be recognized, howJ 
ever5 that the price dis-incentive for manufacturers to consider exports, 
quite apart from the normal problems of breaking into new markets, has made 
exporting, with some exceptions, the virtually forgotten aspect of industriali-
zation, The Export Promotion Council report refers to considerable "slack" 
in the exporting sector (p,4 ) by which they appear to mean that the scope 
for expanding export production is considerable. Under these circumstances 
it is not easy to speculate as to the sort of export performance to predict 
in a non-'distorted situation. One does not get far with trend lines or the 
extrapolation of historical performance, for instance; and while at least 
some of the industries that could get/exports are often in existence, they 
are completely unaccustomed to thinking in any but domestic market terms. 
Other viable industries, furthermore, in view of the investment incentives 
bias away from export lines and toward import substitution, have never got 
off the ground. 
28, conte/ intensive lines in which the country might have a comparative 
advantage, it is priced out of the market. As John Power has pointed out 
(op, cit0), an inflated wage in one sector makes it erroneously appear that 
the country has a comparative advantage exclusively in the goods of the 
sector in which the high wage does not prevail. Again the result is 
increasing reliance on traditional primary exports, 
29, Bela Balassa, "Industrial Policies of Taiwan and Korea," 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, band 105, heft 1 (1971) 
30, At the recent UNCTAD conference in Santiago, Chile, 
a source of some embarrassment for the hard»won Generalized System 
of Preferences for the goods of the less developed countries was 
that only a dozen or so countries are taking any advantage of it. 
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It is worth noting that the East African partner states have been 
the major markets for Kenya manufactured products,, Exports to our Community 
partners however, have been growing erratically, if at all, at an average 
rate of about 1%7», which respresents a declining share of total Kenya 
31 
exports which have themselves been growing at less than 2% . The 
commodity composition of what has been happening to these exports is also 
of considerable interest. The percentage of manufactured products in Kenyans 
East African Exports has always been far greater than the same percentage in 
total exports. In part this market for Kenya manufactures has been a reflection 
of natural advantages Kenya has over suppliers from outside East Africa, in 
part it has been a result of a common tariff against non-East African imports, 
implying that these countries imports from Kenya have not necessarily been 
competitive with imports from the rest of the world. 
The problem has been that Kenya, despite transfer taxes and the 
various other community arrangements to try and redress the situation, 
has run a continuing trade surplus with its two partner states as follows: 
Kenya's Trade Balance with Tanzania and Uganda, 1966-71 K£'000 
_ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 9 7 1 * 
Exports-ImportSo„.17,778 12,725 13,992 16,974 15,465 18,745 
"Provisional from Economic Survey, 1971 & 1972 
It is hardly surprising that under these circumstances Tanzania and Uganda 
have been increasingly reluctant to buy Kenya goods at greater that world 
priceso The result has been that a number of mechanisms such as state trading 
have been employed to, in effect, shelve the common market agreement and 
buy from the chepest source, Coi«fo ignoring the common tariff, or else 
buy from local producers regardless of higher costs. These two countries, 
in other words, are blowing the whistle on Kenya's exploitation of their 
foreign exchange earning capacity to support high cost Kenyan industries. 
The pressure is already on for jnterterritcrial payments settlement to 
32 be made in local currencies. 
310 Calculated for the years 1966 though 1971 from the Economic, 
Surveys of 1971 & 1972, Republic of Kenya Tables 3„11 and 3.12 respectively. 
32. The Export Promotion Council survey (op»cit„) recorded anguished 
cries from exporters to East African partner states who have found growing 
impediments put in their way by the importing countries© It concludes: 
"Rapid moves towards selfJsufficiency in Uganda and Tanzania despite 
EAC arrangements, are making a growing number of Kenyan Exporters 
increasingly despondent about their chances of maintaining sales in these 
territories." 
CS 18 <=3 
It is interesting to note that since 1966, the composition of 
) 
East African imports from Kenya has been shifting away from the somewhat 
more easily substitutable lines and towards lines where Kenya appears to 
be more competitive with the rest of the world. Consumer goods and textiles, 
for instance, where Wasowns data suggests that effective protection is high 
and profitability at world prices is low,have shown a marked decline, 
"Other capital goods" and "semi-manufactures", on the other hand, for which 
Wasow's data generally indicate low or negative effective protection in Kenya 
and high "world price profitability" (the data classifications are not quite 
equivalent, detailed comparisons are therefore precluded) have increased 
markedly in the imports of these countries from Kenya, Total Kenya exports 
to these countries have fluctuated, around a zero growth rate, and when 
more recent figures become available, a substantial decline would not be 
surprising,. 
There is little doubt that the East African experience can be to 
some extent generalized to a number of other African and so-called "possible 
radius" markets,, It became painfully evident at the All African Trade Fair 
that almost every country was producing the sa.me "easy import substitutes", 
and generally doing so inefficiently behing protective barriers, (Particularly 
embarrassing were the not infrequent instances where the same foreign firm 
was producing the same import substitute behind similar protection in 
a number of different countries and presumably justifying their protection 
on scale economy and "keep out those nasty foreigner" grounds,) The Kenya 
Export Promotion Council's series of Market Survey Reports for these near by 
country markets frequently comes to similar conclusions, 
33 
Volker Vinnai looks at Kenya's African Trade in recent years 
and finds a shifting composition of buyers from Kenya which can largely be 
explained on grounds of market countries' local protection of these easy 
import substitutes. While Sudan, for instance, purchased goods worth K£ 1,4 34 mill, in 1964, by 1970 this figure had dropped to K£ 0,2 mill. Exports 
33, Volker Vinnai "Kenya's African Trade 1964^1970" IDS Working 
Paper No, 30, March 1972, 
34, Mr, Brian Hobson Chairman of the Kenya Export Promotion Council, 
in some helpful conunents on an earlier draft of this paper has pointed out to 
me that political factors and bilateral deals with customers for 
Sudanis rather limited range of exports goes some distance in explaining 
the Sudanese figures. 
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to all African countries have maintained a reasonably respectable growth, 
with Ethiopia, Zaire and Somaliarecording substantial growth in imports 
from Kenya. 35% of non-East African exports within the continent however, 
went to Zambia, which, in large measure was attributable to that country's 
distaste for trading with her southern neighbours. Zambia's recent decision 
to forget idelogical differences in her choice of suppliers is already 
cutting very substantially into Kenya's market there0 
The general comment that seems justified in looking at the pros-' 
pects for Kenya's exports to neighbouring countries is the rather obvious 
one, and this is born out by both the exporter survey and the market survey 
referred to, and by discussions with exporters: Kenya products that are not 
competitive in price and quality do not sta nd a chance. Reliance on some 
preferential market arrangement, or the fruits of some official trade dele-1 
gation, to sell non-competitive Kenya products will get nowhere. If, on 
the other hand, the exchange rate and fiscal biases against exports 
were removed, Kenya industries would not remain exclusively ensconced in 
a protected local market; they would be given the chance to, and perforce 
would have to, compete on equal terms with overseas suppliers. With 
minimal help and advice on such problems as marketing links, Kenya industries 
would have a very good chance of capturing a large share of nearby countries' 
markets in a limited range of products. While it is obviously possible 
to be overly sanguine about the trade prospects within groups of less 
developed countries, access to each«,bther' s markets and movement toward 
specialization between countries would appear to be far superior to the 
duplicative development of inefficient, inward looking, and eventually 
35 stunted industrialization in each of them. 
As far as markets in the more developed countries are concerned, 
again much of the pessimism that pervades Kenyan industry is a consequence 
of the anti-export distortions referred to earlier and the pattern of 
investments that they have spawned. Despite a number of pernicious price 
distortions in Kenya's agricultural sector, and the seemingly insuperable 
institutional problems that often seem to prevent the development of 
adequate, reliable, industrially oriented supplies, it is a sector with 
a great deal of potential and considerable dynamism. It has the added 
35. To put the comparative advantage argument in its simplest form: 
if for the same local resource cost we can produce five bicycles and two 
fridges on the one hand, and ten bicycles on the other, and if we can 
trade four bicycles for two fridges, we are not very sensible to be in 
fridge production. In general, the same resources obviously produce a 
larger national product as a result of this kind of trade. 
J 20 J 
advantage of not being burdened with artificially high labour costs, its 
land resources are remarkably diverse and productive, it(* s technology generating 
and problem solving research establishment is hard to match in middle Africa, 
There is every reason why it should be the supply base for a series of 
processing industries geared toward the industrialized countries. 
This paper has been written without the detailed research necessary 
to make specific industry by industry recommendations, but the sorts of 
agriculturally based industries that come to mind are leather goods of a 
large variety, vegetable oils of the manufacturing ^intermediate and industrial 
lubricant as well as the edible type, insecticides, animal feeds, natural 
fibre products such as sisal mats of various types, ropes, and, certain textiles 
to mention only the non-food items. In the food categories the much touted 
discrimination of European consumers against African products is being belied 
daily by the burgeoning (but still grossly underdeveloped) market in Europe 
for Kenya horticultural products, Fresh, frozen, dried and canned products, 
particularly in the vegetable and beef lines, not to mention a range of 
speciality products of the confectionary and condiment variety, would 
undoubtedly develop if the incentives were right and the lethargic 
bureaucratic habits and the institutional bottlenecks were broken. 
In terms of the capital requirements for the types of developments 
to which I have referred, I think most observers would agree that there are 
unlikely to be constraints, I have already referred to the export versus 
import substitution choice for investors and the fact that the lack of 
enthusiasm in the former direction is likely to be the result of the 
incentive structure being toward the latter. 
Skill constraints are clearly a continuing problem in Kenya and, 
again, here is where the opportunity cost of the biases we are talking 
about are likely to be most evident, Skill and entrepreneurship, however, 
must be regarded as self-'generating resources. The more they are put 
to work the more they develop. It is likely that relevant skills and 
entrepreneurship are increased more by experience and productive activity 
than by the expansion of University courses for instance (an unholy 
admission for an academic), though training programs of various sorts can 
obviously play a crucial part. In the meantime, skills that are necessary 
can and must be imported. The enterprises in which Kenyans can gain the 
experience and skill will simply not get off the ground at an adequate 
pace if they are unable to draw in good enough expatriate skills on a reliable 
enough basis. 
36 
Expatriate personnel are expensive and firms will have the incentive to 
replace them with Kenyans as the Kenyans develop the necessary skills and 
experience; there is even a good case for increasing this incentive for 
replacement by a tax on expatriate personnel. It is unlikely, however, 
that rule-of-thumb criteria and work permit allocation by government per-
sonnel, who cannot possibly acquire or process the information necessary 
for making anything but a totally arbitrary intervention in the affairs 
of a particular enterprise, will help in making rational progress toward 
more rapid Kenyanization, 
On the question of technology, export criented industries, forced, 
as they will be to face the bracing winds of price and quality competition, are 
likely to be far more innovative than the category of inward looking, protected 
industries we have been discussingo Government's policies and contribution 
in this area are crucial; it is particularly important that individual 
enterprises should not be faced with inappropriate input and factor prices; 
wage policies are particularly significant in this regard, as are policies 
affecting the capital price. Once again, however, it must be recognized that 
arbitrary and ill-informed interventions from government into the decision 
making of a particular industry on such questions as what technology to use, 
who and when to employ,where to locate, etc, can only have the effect of 
reducing that industry's competitiveness. 
Apart from the general government function of smoothing the pathway 
(rather than creating impediments) for exporting industries, a good deal 
can be done in the area of information market research and advisory services. 
Foreign exporting firms, as has been pointed out, very often know the ropes 
and have market links in other countries which they should be encouraged to use. 
The same is not true of the local and especially the smaller firm. The 
current programme of trade exhibitions and commercial attaches is an 
effort in the right direction but, as it stands, it is little more than an empty 
institutional gesture. Its current contribution to increasing Kenya's exports 
is negligible. Trade attaches are generally not familiar with Kenya products 
or potential; enquiries at trade stands are not followed through, and virtu-
ally never result in finalized orders. Both Government and the private 
sector, in other words, are lethargic, unimaginative, inconsistent, and 
virtually oblivious of the development potential of outward looking industri-
alization, This private sector lethargy, in turn, results from the existing 
36, Expatriate personnel also cost foreign exchange. If they are 
coming into foreign exchange efficient firms, however, they may well be 
worth a good deal more than is paid for them. 
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structure of Government policy and the consequent anti-fexport distortions 
in the incentive and price system. 
If the industrial sector is to break the constraint of the small 
local market and make its contribution to employment, foreign exchange 
earning and growth, a major reorienting of skills and investment into 
efficient exporting industries is required. To accomplish this reorienta* 
tion, a few random "export promotion" policies and measures will not suffice. 
What is needed is a revamping of the trade, commercial and exchange rate 
policies that currently conspire to inhibit non-'traditional and manufactured 
37 exports, and keep the industrial sector looking inward0 
37. I am grateful for the time that. Government and semiJgovernment personnel , 
and private exporters have allowed me to discuss the topic of this paper 
with them. I am also grateful to the stimulating enviroment and specific 
help that has been provided by my University of Nairobi colleagues 
Stephen Lewis, John Power and Bernard Wasow. Each of the above should be 
blamed in part for some part of the views expressed, but I will not identify 
which. 
